Political crises have a way of leaving marks on the governments that navigate them — marks that shape how those governments are subsequently judged. The Iran conflict, with its public diplomatic friction and internal party tensions, was the kind of episode that could define the early period of the current British government.
The prime minister had come to power promising a new kind of foreign policy — one more attuned to democratic values and more cautious about military adventurism. The Iran crisis tested whether that promise was compatible with the realities of governing a country whose most important alliance demanded a level of military commitment that not all of its governing party was comfortable with.
The initial refusal to grant American basing rights appeared, at least in the short term, to be a statement of principle. The subsequent reversal — under sustained American pressure — was more difficult to characterise. Critics argued it showed that the government had got the worst of both worlds: the diplomatic cost of refusing without the domestic political benefit of maintaining that refusal.
The president’s public criticism, and his warning that delays would be remembered, would feature in the retrospective assessments of the episode for years to come. So would the image of British aircraft carriers being placed on higher readiness in what was widely interpreted as a damage-limitation exercise.
How the crisis was ultimately managed — and whether the relationship with Washington was repaired to mutual satisfaction — would play a significant role in determining the government’s legacy in foreign and security policy.